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Chapter Two 
CONTEMPLATION AND FINE WINE: 
TASTING WITH SAINTSBURY, 
SCHOPENHAUER, AND PATER 
 
  
One never knows when it will happen. I went to my cellar to choose an 
accompaniment for a chestnut soufflé and a 1995 Domaine Huet Vouvray Clos du Bourg 
Demi-Sec returned with me . Before opening that wine, I had a set of informed 
questions...  
Huet makes some of the best Vouvrays, so I expected a distinctly good wine. I 
wondered how far the sweetness had softened over 19 years. How did it compare to 
previous Huets or to wines from Champalou or Domaine des Baumard? Fully expecting to 
be considering these and many similar questions, something completely different took 
place. “Oh?” my wife murmured after her first sip. I knew from her tone she was 
becoming immersed in the taste. I was simultaneously being pulled deeply into it. I was 
not, as expected, noting the complexity of the bouquet or the depth of flavor or the great 
match for the soufflé—observations that did eventually arise. Before they came forth an 
intense experience of pure taste and pure smell filled my awareness. While clearly taste 
and smell both were so fundamental that they transcended analysis or categorization.  
Wanting to linger  
When this experience occurs, I am always compelled to wonder, “What happened?” 
Searching for ways to make sense of the experience has gradually led me to observe that 
something similar happens in other situations. After a pre-concert lecture, I was prepared 
to listen to the Shanghai Quartet performing Beethoven’s String Quartet No.15, Op.132. 
Noting the expected astonishing transitions Beethoven created, I was suddenly no longer 
hearing “superb musicians” or considering the tone of the “1600 Giovanni Paolo Maggini” 
the first violin was playing; I was not even aware that I was hearing a Beethoven string 
quartet. The sound completely filled my consciousness. I was “all ears,” as some say. I 
recently purchased Ernest Koerlin’s still life gouache, Copy After Zurbarán  of Francisco de 
Zurbarán’s 1633 Still Life with Lemons, Oranges, and a Rose . Zurbarán’s 1650 Still Life 1
with Pottery Jars  (on title page) had, surrounded by so many superb paintings in the 2
Museo Nacional del Prado in Madrid, “taken my breath 
away,” and now, years later, prompted the purchase of 
this fine copy of the only other authenticated Zurbarán 
still life. Paintings and music occasionally produce such 
experiences. Might they tell us something about 
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experiences like the one I had with that Huet Vouvray? In relation to visual art and music, 
this experience is normally called contemplation. In attempting to understand what 
happens in  unique wine experiences, we can explore similarities to experiences of 
paintings and music.  
As I attentively examine these experiences, I begin to suspect that they are 
fundamentally more similar than they are different. How they are similar, despite their 
obvious differences, is complicated. On the one hand, all three are emphatically pure 
sense experiences. They also have clear differences. A still life affects our sight but 
provides almost no stimulus to any other sense, even if it portrays intensely sensuous 
things like oranges, lemons, and a rose, as does the Zurbarán copied by my colleague 
Ernest Koerlin. Wine significantly affects one’s senses of smell and taste, less so touch and 
least of all sight. The sounds of poured wine and water are only subtly different. Music 
reverses this list by affecting hearing most of all, sight and touch to diminishing degrees, 
and taste and smell not at all. While affecting different senses, these experiences can also 
share the kind of sense experience that takes place. Wine, like visual art and music, lends 
itself to the opportunity for contemplation, and it is precisely contemplation that provides 
the basis for the fundamental similarity we need to consider.  
To be clear, while it is, indeed, possible (though not necessary) to think about visual 
art and about music within the context of contemplation, contemplation is not normally 
associated with the experience of wine. References to “wanting to linger” over a good 
wine do occur, but these are infrequent. This might well be why I have long remembered 
George Saintsbury’s  statement about an 1848 Hermitage:  3
... this wine was so full and so complicated it never seemed to finish. You 
could meditate on it; and it kept up with your meditation.” (Notes on a 
Cellar-Book, 1920)  
 
To meditate on a wine describes something quite precise about the 
experience. In the simplest terms, meditation indicates taking 
one’s time; it means lingering over the experience. Meditation, 
contemplation, is a looking at, a considering attentively. The Latin 
root, templum, names a special place designated for observation. 
On the other hand, our normal experiences of tasting wine come in 
numerous forms, based upon practical goals. Assessing which 
wines we want to lay down involves a critical, comparative 
(Olympian) ranking. This can be done with much sophistication, as 
in the tastings in a magazine like The World of Fine Wine, or in 
many more casual degrees. Many wine tastings involve 
documenting similar taste and smell elements between wines and 
other things: violets, herbs, and truffles, as well as Zurbarán’s 
lemons, oranges, and roses. Making such lists is helpful in learning about wine and in 
sharing experiences with others. Each of us can expand this list of normal experiences of 
tasting wine. Let’s also note that looking at art or listening to music has parallel lists of 
normal kinds of experience. We ask, “Who is the artist?” or “When was it painted?” 
Contemplation of music or art occurs, in my experience, only on rare occasions. 
Saintsbury thus encourages my odd questions: What does it mean to meditate on a wine? 
What kind of experience is this? He gives us an element, the duration of taste, but this, 
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too, can be one of our usual observations about fine wines. The task here is not to pursue 
a well-known path despite its obvious usefulness and unending richness. My task now is 
rather to ask questions that turn our attention toward better understanding what 
contemplation of wine or music or art entails.  
A deeper understanding of Being  
A path to follow is in Chapter One  Expect the Unexpected. For Kant, an aesthetic 
judgment, what he called a “judgment of taste,” entitles us to consider something 
universally beautiful. Such a judgment is based on a unique experience: the mental 
activity of disinterested contemplation. Kant’s goal was to articulate the condition present 
within our mental faculties that make aesthetic judgments valid. He found that experience 
to be the free play of the Understanding and the Imagination. Having identified this basis 
for making aesthetic judgments, Kant had fulfilled his task. He left examining the details 
of the experience of the free play of the Understanding and the Imagination to us. 
Fortunately, a follower of Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer  (1788–1860), is more helpful in 4
providing insight about the nature of the experience of disinterested 
contemplation. Schopenhauer includes in his 1818 magnum opus The 
World as Will and Representation (WWR hereafter) an extensive 
exploration of the arts and a corresponding discussion of the role 
contemplative experience plays in our encounter with the various arts.  
WWR is an ambitious work, wanting to explain in a complete 
manner “what is,” what philosophers call Being. WWR begins with 
describing the world as we experience it in our everyday lives. We act as 
individuals engaged with particular things. This analysis draws upon 
elements of Plato and Kant. For Kant and Schopenhauer, the cognition we 
have of individual things produces knowledge of appearances 
(phenomena). This is what Schopenhauer calls collectively the World as 
Representation (first aspect). The computer with which I am writing this essay and the 
desk on which it sits are two of countless individual things in my everyday world. We have 
experiential knowledge of individual things, and we can have more organized, scientific 
knowledge of the everyday world as well. Schopenhauer argues that we can also have 
another, different kind of cognition of things in the world that is better understood in 
relation to Plato’s Theory of Ideas. Each individual thing is an example of a multiplicity of 
the same kinds of things. There are many computers in the world and many desks; the 
computer and desk in front of me are but single examples. The most significant quality of 
these individual things is that they are in a state of constant change. When I say that I 
know what a desk is, I am saying that I not only know the desk at which I am sitting now 
but also that I can distinguish other objects in the world as desks or not desks. I can even 
determine whether an object seen for the first time is or is not a desk. What enables me 
to do this is the presence in my mind, the cognition of, what Plato called the Idea of (a) 
desk. Cognition of the Ideas of computer, cat, desk enable me to distinguish computers 
from cats, desks, and the multiplicity of things in my everyday world. Cognition of Platonic 
Ideas constitutes what Schopenhauer calls the World as Representation in its second 
aspect. Knowledge of Platonic Ideas gives us a deeper understanding of Being.  
The Third Book of WWR (§§30–52) contains Schopenhauer’s discussion of art. For 
Schopenhauer, art directly involves cognition of the Platonic Ideas. The individual things 
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with which we occupy ourselves in our daily lives are for Schopenhauer fundamentally 
different kinds of things from Platonic Ideas. The change from cognition of individual 
things to cognition of ideas involves, he argues, a change both in the kind of object known 
and in the subject who knows. As ordinary individuals, we have “interested” cognition of 
individual things because they can fulfill our needs and desires. The desk in front of me is 
a specific physical thing that fulfills my need for a place to hold my computer while I sit 
and compose this chapter. To make the change from cognition of individual things to 
cognition of ideas, there must also be a parallel change in the knowing subject. Both 
changes are integral to our discussion of contemplation of the arts and of wine.  
The change in the subject required to make cognition of the Platonic Idea possible 
entails the abrupt ending of our usual pragmatic interaction with things. It is possible for 
the mind to drop its usual concern for satisfying particular needs and to elevate itself and 
become absorbed in the contemplation of the object presented. Schopenhauer insists that 
this contemplation is constituted entirely by the use of one or more of our senses; it 
remains purely perceptual. This contemplation is the free play of the Understanding and 
the Imagination first described by Kant. Schopenhauer explicitly says that this does not 
entail allowing abstract thought or concepts of pure reason to take control of our 
consciousness. We lose ourselves in the pure perception of the object present. As 
suggested earlier, such contemplation involves a space removed from the everyday—a 
“temple” devoted to observation. It remains a place in that it is characterized by sense 
perception, albeit of a unique kind. The losing of oneself in this radical change, becoming 
disinterested, means the cessation of our normal perception of things that wants to make 
use of them to fulfill our needs.  
Schopenhauer acknowledges that this change in our consciousness is the exception 
to our normal ways of perceiving things. Yet, the transition happens in relation to ordinary 
things in our world like a landscape or a tree, a rock or a building. Sitting here in my 
study, I can see out the window two sugar maple trees. My usual relation to them is 
unquestionably practical. For much of the year, our house is kept comfortably cool by their 
shade from late morning until sundown. When their leaves fall, I collect them in a leaf 
composter that produces perfect mulch for our fruit trees. The trees, like my desk, fulfill a 
number of regular needs. These trees can also, as Schopenhauer says, readily become 
representatives of their Ideas. Their intricate, clear, determinate form can oblige us to 
elevate our perception of them to perception of an Idea. This is particularly true now that 
all their leaves have fallen. The object of aesthetic contemplation is not any individual 
thing but rather an Idea striving for revelation. When we contemplate a tree aesthetically, 
we are not contemplating this individual sugar maple tree, and neither is it the usual me 
who contemplates. It is not even the spatial form before us that is being contemplated. 
What is contemplated, Schopenhauer says, is the expression of the tree, its innermost 
Being. Natural beauty has this capability to lift us above our usual self-interested 
pragmatism that binds us to specific individual things we wish to use. We rise on special 
occasions to a perception of Being.  
The stairway of nature  
While natural beauty can oblige us to make the transition to pure contemplation of 
Ideas, the beautiful in art facilitates this transition, says Schopenhauer, far more 
powerfully. WWR §36 argues that art is precisely a mode of cognition focused upon the 
truly fundamental aspects of the world. Art arises from our intense perception of the 
world’s appearances. Art presents the Ideas that underlie those appearances. Indeed, for 
Schopenhauer the project of art is precisely to repeat the eternal ideas grasped through 
pure contemplation. While Plato suggested that art was inferior because it merely held up 
a mirror that makes copies of individual things (appearances), Schopenhauer considers art 
a far superior mode of cognition. For Schopenhauer, art, as the predisposition to extract 
from everyday things their inner Ideas and then to make them available for 
contemplation, is the work of genius. And again, he insists that this contemplation is 
entirely perceptual. This can be explored further by turning to Schopenhauer’s discussion 
of the individual arts.  
In considering the arts, Schopenhauer uses a hierarchy originating in ancient 
Greece: The Great Chain of Being, or scala naturæ (stairway of nature). The Great Chain 
is a progression of kinds of beings from the lowest level of matter (rocks, metals, and so 
on), to plants, then animals, humans, and (for many, though not for Schopenhauer) 
ascending still further to angels and culminating in God. In Schopenhauer’s version, steps 
on this ladder of Being have corresponding arts. His artistic hierarchy begins with 
architecture. Architecture serves our everyday needs and, in this sense, is not actually art 
at all. Architecture can also, however, be a fine art that brings to clear perceptiveness 
Ideas of the simplest kinds of Being: gravity, rigidity, hardness, cohesion, and reaction to 
light. The universal qualities of materials like stone or wood become available to us for 
contemplation through architecture. Contemplating architecture, says Schopenhauer, 
makes possible the perception of the inner nature of Being and not just the outer surface. 
The inner nature seen in this way includes discord between gravity and rigidity. In simple 
terms, a building might be considered a lump of material clinging to the surface of the 
earth via the force of gravity. Beams and walls resist gravity through the their rigidity. 
Domes of cathedrals (Schopenhauer mentions St Peter’s and St Paul’s) strive toward the 
earth via resisting pillars. The forces operating within stone or wood—and for us, in steel 
and glass and countless other modern building 
materials— become available for perception in 
architecture. Architecture enables us to contemplate 
these natural forces.  
This contemplation of Platonic Ideas is facilitated most 
fully in great works of architecture like St Peter’s and 
St Paul’s. One has to wonder what Schopenhauer 
might have said of the Crystal Palace  that housed 5
The Great Exhibition of 1851. He lived long enough to 
have seen it and did travel to London. He was not a 
great admirer of modernity. Would he have 
considered it a work of genius? One might be able to 
contemplate the conflict between gravity and rigidity 
in my university professor’s 70-year-old oak desk. It 
would be easier to do this in my 110-year-old wooden-
frame house with its half-hip roof. Contemplating gravity and rigidity in Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s Fallingwater  brings the Ideas of the forces of 6
nature to far clearer perceptiveness.  
The question we may now consider is whether 
fine wine also provides an opportunity to contemplate 
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Ideas. Are there parallels in wine to gravity, rigidity, cohesion, hardness, or reaction to 
light? Wine, more than architecture, is typically considered a practical part of our 
everyday lives. As a useful thing, wine is part of the marketplace and is open to critical 
and scientific investigation. Is there a parallel in wine to the conflict between the forces of 
gravity and rigidity? What about the forces at work in the ripening of grapes? For 
Schopenhauer, the most pervasive quality of Being that we contemplate in architecture is 
conflict or discord between the forces of inorganic matter. The ’95 Huet Vouvray Clos du 
Bourg that initiated this discussion had a bouquet and taste permeated with qualities of 
wine made from a specific kind of grapes that ripen properly perhaps only in one place—
the middle Loire. The experience immediately rose to a different plane from that first clear 
observation. The ripening of grapes to make wine of this quality involves the struggle and 
discord of organic forces of nature, just as the steel beams and reinforced concrete of 
Fallingwater involve the struggling forces of inorganic nature. The grapes that make a 
Huet Vouvray never grow in the most favorable climate. Indeed, they must grow at what 
is called the northern limit of the vine. Instead of having grown in conditions that produce 
large quantities of ripe fruit, fine wines come from grapes that struggle with spring frosts, 
inconsistent sun and moisture, diseases, variable harvest conditions, and/or other 
challenges to achieve ripeness. The same Chenin Blanc grapes of the middle Loire are 
grown in other locations around the world. Most of those locations are far more favorable 
to ripening the grapes, and they produce distinctly generic wines. In the bouquet and 
taste of a fine wine, it is possible to have a standard perception of ripened grapes. It is 
also possible to perceive the underlying struggle of forces. In the ’95 Huet, there was a 
singular smell and taste that was not derived from normal analytic perceptions of either 
ripe grapes or a classic Vouvray profile. That taste made possible a perception of the 
forces involved in the struggle to ripen grapes.  
Schopenhauer points out that the conflict that reveals the inner nature of Being 
appears in architecture in perfect distinctness when indestructible forces deprive each 
other of the shortest path to satisfaction. Gravity is only indirectly able to achieve its 
centripetal satisfaction through the intermediary of the rigid pillar; and likewise, rigidity 
needs the vertiginous that it can resist. The more this conflict is prolonged, the more 
clearly these forces become visible. The above-mentioned difficulties of plant growth are 
prolonged over the growing season, and they are repeated with diverse variations 
annually as well. This is particularly true of Chenin Blanc grapes ripening in the middle 
Loire. Most of the time while tasting a wine, we are focused upon results caused by 
specific climatic qualities, such as the extreme heat of the 2003 vintage in many parts of 
Europe. The list of distinct causes of specific results is well known: frost, rain at harvest, 
and so on and so forth. It is possible that on rare, unexpected occasions, wines can take 
us beyond knowledge of specific conditions and allow us to taste and smell the forces 
underlying these outcomes.  
Understanding and Imagination  
When we turn to other natural forces in plant life, perceptible conflicts multiply. In 
order to have nourishing foods when fresh produce is unavailable, we have devised 
diverse methods of preservation. The discovery of wine was probably an accidental part of 
this practical wish. Someone, as the story goes, forgot grapes stored in a jar. Grapes can 
crush themselves by their own weight, and the juice resulting can ferment by itself—with 
the aid of wild yeasts necessary for fermentation that naturally grow on grape skins. 
When this happens, the resulting wine would have an alcoholic content similar to 
intentionally made wines because fermentation continues only until the alcohol reaches 
±15%, at which point the yeasts are killed and fermentation stops. This wine would be 
more palatable than the fermented juice of other fruits due to its balance of sugars and 
acids. Whoever discovered wine this way had no idea of what had happened, except that 
the resulting liquid had a second life of its own. Fresh fruit will lose its possibility of 
nourishment and spoil rather quickly. The raisin or a jelly may prolong the conflict of 
preservation and decay in grapes and thereby make the conflict perceptible for a longer 
time. Wine can make this struggle available for perception for far longer. 
The wines that invited me to linger have come most often from my own cellar. I 
started laying down wines once I realized that the finest wines reward us with greater 
pleasures if allowed to mature slowly in the bottle. As Schopenhauer would say, I have an 
“interested” relationship to wine. I wanted to learn about variations from vintage to 
vintage in wines from selected producers. Barolo became a primary focus, partially 
because I was fortunate to have been able to taste numerous age-worthy vintages of the 
late 1960s from fine producers such as Marcarini, Cordero di Montezemolo, E Pira, G 
Conterno, and Bartolo Mascarello. When I opened a 1978 Poderi Aldo Conterno Bricco 
Bussia Vigna Cicala in 2010, I had more expectations and questions than 
I did of the Huet Vouvray. The first commercial Aldo Conterno wines were 
made in 1971, and by the time this ’78 went into my cellar his reputation 
was rapidly rising. Would it match up to my expectations, I wondered, 
coming from such a good vintage and made after he had time to develop 
his winemaking style? How did it compare to other mature Barolos? I 
knew his style was reported to be a blend of traditional and modernist 
approaches (as applied to wines of the 70’s and early 80’s). How did this 
style compare to similarly made wines from Marcarini or Cordero di 
Montezemolo, or to his brother’s or Pira’s more traditional wines? As I 
sniffed and took my first taste, there were many such questions, and all of them were 
eventually answered. However, I found myself immediately confronted by an extraordinary 
bouquet and taste that did not lend itself to those questions. All I could do was let my 
attention be filled by that taste and smell. My primary perception was not concerned with 
vintage or producer or style or degree of maturity or evolution. Once again, I was 
experiencing the free play of my Understanding and Imagination. What made that 
experience possible was, I am inclined to say, the pure perception of the struggle of the 
forces that ripen grapes and of the struggle of the forces that mature wine. The 
coalescence of those forces, at that moment, produced taste and smell experiences quite 
unlike the ones I had been expecting.  
Entering the temple  
As I have my own “discussion” with Schopenhauer about the taste of that ’78 
Barolo, my questions evolve. How appropriately does Schopenhauer’s analysis of 
contemplation of works of art translate to my experiences tasting wine? Does an elevation 
actually take place—out of my usual experience of tasting wine and into a separate level 
of disinterested contemplation? I have no trouble saying that this is, for me, quite an 
accurate description of my experience with wine on occasion. It happens more frequently 
with wines made by the finest producers from the finest terroir. The 32-year-old ’78 Aldo 
Conterno Barolo Bricco Bussia Vigna Cicala was easily recognized as one of the best 
Barolos I had ever tasted. So good, in fact that I did eventually wonder if it was as good 
as an ’82 Marcarini Brunate (discussed in Ch. One) or a ’71 Cordero di Montezemolo 
Enrico VI; his brother’s,  G Conterno’ ’7171 Barolo Monfortino Riserva Speciale or a ’71 
from E Pira. The question, I realized, is a poor one. Equating or ranking wines of this 
stature covers up how each is superb and unique. More interesting, however, is the fact 
that not all of these “best Barolos tasted” made for an occasion in which I was elevated to 
that very special contemplative experience. The ’71 Cordero di Montezemolo Enrico VI had 
one of the most extraordinary bouquets of any Barolo I had tried. The experience of 
tasting it was smelling a single example of “the best bouquet” of a wine, Barolo, that 
perhaps excels most of all in its bouquet. The experience remained focused on that 
extraordinary bouquet. The ’78 Aldo Conterno was the most complete assembly of 
bouquet, complex taste, and long finish of any of these wines. But the taste experience 
did not stop or even start there. That Aldo Conterno and one ’82 Marcarini Brunate 
allowed me to enter the temple. If I were disposed to assign scores, I would rank all five 
as 95+ wines, but that is based on an experience of a different kind from what I am 
concerned with here. 
A second question arises from this conversation with Schopenhauer. Does wine 
sometimes present the inner forces of plant life for contemplation, as architecture 
sometimes presents the forces of stone and wood for contemplation? What does one 
contemplate in these experiences? Is it the inner nature of Being? This seems to be a 
more complex question than the first about the experience of disinterested perception. For 
Schopenhauer, the two parts of disinterested contemplation do not play an equal role on 
each occasion. Rather, they occur in an equilibrium. Sometimes the release from everyday 
interested cognition, and the elevation into disinterestedness, will be more important than 
the Idea contemplated. When the Idea contemplated is more complex, the cognition of 
the Idea will be more important. The Ideas contemplated in the Beethoven string quartet 
are, for Schopenhauer, more complex (higher on the scala naturæ) than those in the 
Zurbarán still life. Contemplating them would favor one or the other side of this 
equilibrium. The Ideas of inorganic nature in architecture, and those of organic nature in 
plant life, are at the lowest end of the scala naturæ. In contemplating Ideas from either, 
release from everyday cognition would be more important than the Idea contemplated. 
Contemplating the higher-level organic forces of nature is slightly more informative of the 
nature of Being than is contemplating inorganic forces.  
I was walking around my house, wondering about exactly what I am contemplating 
in a fine wine, when I happened to glance out of a window at our garden, the orchard 
behind it, and a recently harvested field beyond the orchard. It was just before sundown. 
“Oh, the light is interesting,” I started to say to myself. This thought was immediately 
replaced by, “It is light that I am seeing.” Usually I look out that window and see the 
things in the garden, or things in the orchard, or what is growing in the field because of 
the light. Almost always I am simply looking at the things present. I might note that I 
need to cut the grass or water the tomatoes or that the soybeans had been harvested. But 
when I found myself pulled into just “looking at the light,” I was seeing differently. The 
paintings of JMW Turner can be described as incandescent. An inner quality of 
candescence was very much a part of that visual experience. Light itself, as a force of 
nature, as a force of Being, made itself available for me for contemplation. There seemed, 
once again, to be much that was similar to those unusual experiences with wines. 
Contemplating a ’78 Aldo Conterno Bricco Bussia Vigna Cicala can indeed be similar to the 
experiences that might happen looking at Fallingwater, a Turner, or the light in my garden.  
The life in all flowing things  
Grapes, it was noted above, transform themselves into wine and thus give a new 
context to Schopenhauer’s claim that genius lets us see what nature endeavored to do but 
could not because of inner conflicts. A winemaker such as Aldo Conterno lets us taste and 
smell what nature intends when grapes transform themselves into wine. In fine wine, we 
are able to apprehend what nature intended far more clearly. A third Idea—in addition to 
growth and nourishment—which struggles for revelation through the contemplation of 
wine, is precisely this self- transformation. In order to grasp the complexities of this Idea, 
we might turn briefly to an essay by Walter Pater , “A Study of Dionysus,” in Greek 7
Studies (1922). For Pater, the religion of Dionysus in ancient Greece was the religion that 
developed among the people who spent their lives among grape vines. Writing as if he 
had read Schopenhauer, Pater says that the name Dionysus 
recalled for these ancient Greeks a body of flesh under a single 
form (= Idea?), which comprehended its animating soul (inner 
forces) in a whole of thoughts, surmises, and experiences (Pater, 
10). This religion comes from the instinctive belief among people 
at the early stages of a civilization that trees and flowers are 
habitations of living spirits. More advanced peoples restrict this 
belief to animals. For Pater, the religion of Dionysus is a faith 
distinguished by grace. Nymphs are said to animate the lives of 
plants; they nurse the vines by allowing an interplay of sun and 
shade through spinning fine multicolored threads and then 
weaving from them foliage or the petals of flowers or the skins of 
the fruit (Pater, 12). He continues:  
[Dionysus] is the soul of the individual vine first; the young vine at the 
house-door of the newly married, for instance, as the vine-grower stoops 
over it, coaxing and nursing it, like a pet animal or a little child; afterwards, 
the soul of the whole species, the spirit of fire and dew, alive and leaping in a 
thousand vines, as their higher intelligence, brooding more deeply over 
things, pursues, in thought, the generation of sweetness and strength in the 
veins of the tree, the transformation of water into wine, little by little; noting 
all the influences upon it of the heavens above and the earth beneath; and 
shadowing forth, in each pause of the process, an intervening person—what 
is to us but the secret chemistry of nature being to them the mediation of 
living spirits. So they passed on to think of Dionysus (naming him at last 
from the brightness of the sky and the moisture of the earth) not merely as 
the soul of the vine, but of all life in flowing things of which the vine is the 
symbol, because its most emphatic example. [...] He comes at last to have a 
scope equal to that of Demeter, a realm as wide and mysterious as hers; the 
whole productive power of the earth is in him, and the explanation of its 
annual change. As some embody their intuitions of that power in corn, so 
others in wine. He is the dispenser of the earth’s hidden wealth, giver of 
riches through the vine.” (Pater, 13–14)  
I might see life in the sugar maple trees in my yard. But I can see it so much more clearly 
in the vine, and most of all in wine. Brooding over the generation of sweetness and 
strength in the veins of the vine is exactly what can occur in the contemplation of the 
finest wine. The Idea one can contemplate easily in a ’78 Barolo Bricco Bussia Vigna Cicala 
is life as it appears not just in the individual wine but in all flowing things.  
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